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A Crisis in
Insurance
Benjamin Lipson
As the life and health insurance industry evaluates its long-termfinancial goals, the cloud
ofBlack Monday— October 19, 1987, the day the stock market collapsed— blurs its
cherished investment income projections. With investment portfolios under siege, mutual
life insurance companies and stock companies alike are wary ofmaking policy-pricing
miscalculations that couldprove to be disastrous. As ifthat weren 't enough, one single
disease — acquired immunodeficiency syndrome— looms as the most serious threat to life
and health insurersfor the remainder ofthis century. The spread ofthe new disease has
caused insurers to adjust their underwriting requirements by insisting on testsfor the
AIDS antibody as a preconditionfor obtaining insurance. Increasingly, life insurance
companies are prepared to curtail the availability ofinsurance in states thatplace restric-
tions on testingfor insurance purposes. There are also importantprivacy issues that must
be adequately addressed ifsystematic abuse ofthe individual 's right to privacy is to be
avoided.
The liability insurance industry has been in crisis since the early 1980s, when soaring
prime rates and double-digit investment returns led insurance companies, with their
huge pools of capital, into the equity, investment, and other riskier markets. What's more,
they decided that by dropping the prices on insurance products, they could attract even
more premium dollars to invest.
That cash-flow underwriting of the early 1980s, fueled by double-digit interest rates
and aggressive marketing, gave way to a limited availability of liability insurance and
significant rate increases.
Doctors started to leave the practice of medicine. Municipal pools and parks and youth
hockey rinks were closed. Children's products were taken off the market. The availability
of goods and services providing comfort, recreation, and the necessities of life was threat-
ened, and to this day many tavern owners are closing their premises because they cannot
Benjamin Upson is a Boston-based life broker and insurability consultant. He writes a weekly column,
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obtain adequate, affordable liability insurance.
While this was going on five years ago, an inflationary spiral was evolving which dra-
matically increased the cost of litigation and health care— major factors involved in the
payment of liability losses. This coincided with a heightened public awareness of con-
sumer rights in liability situations. Many lawsuits were generated and many claims were
filed as the public decided to get its full share of compensation for the pain and suffering
of an accident or for a product failure.
Then interest rates began to drop. Property and liability insurers found themselves in a
crisis. They had to increase premiums and eliminate writing certain classes of business,
such as medical malpractice, product liability, and pollution liability.
Making things worse were increasingly liberal court interpretations that delivered lia-
bility judgments never before contemplated. Imagine a New Year's reveler leaving a
house party, crashing his automobile into a tree, and ultimately suing the homeowner, his
host. Lawyers have been successful in suits in which it was shown that the homeowner was
careless in overseeing the dispensing of alcohol. 1
Improved 1987 operating figures for the property and casualty insurance companies
reflected the results of their stringent underwriting practices. Happily, the situation is still
improving, with rate relief available for consumers. The trend seems to be reverting to
more reasonable rates in the property insurance field and for certain liability coverages,
other than medical malpractice, products, and pollution coverage. 2
Will a Frightened Industry Want to Respond to
Legitimate Consumer Concerns?
The AIDS crisis is confounding the impact of this otherwise positive trend. As a result of
this unprecedented disease, American consumers are finding it riskier to purchase ade-
quate, affordable life and health insurance without giving away one of their most precious
possessions, their privacy. Insurance companies, long the exemplars of corporate achieve-
ment, now have to contend with the impact ofAIDS on the total mortality among their
clients, a risk not contemplated when most of their insurance was sold and underwritten.
Employers, worried about the infection spreading among their work force, have begun
looking for loopholes in their fringe benefit packages, long a vested right for the U.S.
worker. And, given the skyrocketing growth of AIDS cases, life and health insurance
companies have begun to wonder how long they will be able to offer even the self-insured
forms of coverage.
The biggest problem in the AIDS crisis — for the insurance industry — is viability in
the face of a swelling claims experience. The biggest problem for consumers, however, is
protecting themselves from the insurance industry as it decides how it is going to cope
with the crisis. The early returns are not good for consumers. Instead of facing up to the
problem, the insurance industry is treating the issue with benign neglect. Consumers'
rights to privacy have been abused by secret testing for AIDS. Worse, people with other
conditions — coronary artery disease, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes, alcoholism,
and mental illness, histories that ordinarily would not have prevented them from buying
insurance, even if at a higher premium— are the victims of AIDS-related discriminatory
practices spreading throughout the industry.
In the case of preferred risks, persons who have nothing significant in their medical
histories are being asked to document in great length and detail minor sore throats and
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colds. Heretofore, these conditions were not considered by underwriters. But given the
AIDS mentality, underwriters now fear the worst and are constantly vigilant about any
condition, no matter how slight or how remote, in the event that it could be a by-product of
the AIDS antibody.
Persons with controllable hypertension, successful recoveries from bypass surgery, and
histories of elevated cholesterol and other abnormal blood chemistries are being looked at
closer than ever, and are being accorded few accommodations by underwriters, who
would prefer to err on the side of caution in the rating of substandard risks to compensate
for any adverse mortality that could develop from AIDS-related claims for insureds al-
ready on the books.
In evaluating all of this turmoil, one must take cognizance of the pressures being ap-
plied to the insurance industry today. Gone is the era when the actuarial tables ruled,
when policy sales leaped from year to year, and when the masses faithfully remitted their
premiums, all to the glory and profit of the underwriters. Actuarial tables, commonly
representing valid statistical data of the past combined with current actuarial assumptions
about life expectancy, could be relied upon to predict future mortality — until now. They
have been predictors of the future, but they have no accurate actuarial measurement of the
adverse mortality of AIDS-related claims which could develop from not only risks on the
books, but individuals who are tested and who could acquire the disease in the future.
Today, some companies are wondering how long they can last. Consider TransAmerica
Occidental Life, whose senior vice president David Gooding has stated publicly that from
1982 to 1986 the AIDS risk in life insurance cost the industry twenty times what it would
assume for a person who was healthy according to insurance industry standards.
Early in 1986, Gooding told the National Association of Insurance Commissioners that
insurance companies must adopt new, carefully thought out policies and practices if they
were to remain solvent and meet the claims of tens of millions of policyholders. 3
Given the threat of AIDS-related claims, coupled with insurers' use ofjunk bonds, state
regulators have begun to take notice. In January 1987 the New York State Insurance De-
partment acted to better monitor the solvency of insurers in order to guarantee that funds
would be available to provide the benefits promised to consumers. Authorizing Regula-
tion 126, the department now requires life insurers to match assets with liabilities when
evaluating annuities, annuity benefits, and guaranteed-interest contracts. 4
New York, which was the first state to implement such stringent measures, felt they
were necessary in order to prevent the occurrence in the insurance industry of something
similar to a run on a bank. Regulation 126 assumes increased significance as long as in-
surers continue to use junk bonds as the investments backing the projected yields of cer-
tain insurance products. 5
The required methodology is complex and highly technical and necessitates the use of
various scenarios and projections by the actuaries to determine the insurance company
cash flow when there are various fluctuations in interest rates and different demands for
surrenders. The practice is intended to establish the appropriate safeguards to prevent a
future drain on company surplus.
Meanwhile, the insurance business goes on. Companies continue to issue life and health
policies with the full legal, moral, and fiduciary obligation to their stockholders to make a
profit and underwrite prudently. Companies can, by right, accept and reject risks and set
premiums according to sound underwriting practices. But this process does not include
the right to condone a system that misleads, deceives, or abuses the privacy rights of any
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insurance applicant. This is the AIDS era, however, and there have been deceptions and
abuses.
While the broad effect of AIDS on the insurance industry concerns both life and health
coverage, the way in which this disease will impinge upon both companies and individuals
who are struggling to provide health care to the afflicted is especially poignant. There is
no better way to understand the personal impact of AIDS than by reading a letter like the
following one, from an anonymous Boston reader ofmy column, "Insurance":
My lover has AIDS. I think I could be a carrier of the AIDS antibody, but I have no
intention of taking any blood tests. A positive test result would serve no useful pur-
pose.
My lover and I have insurance questions, as he is reaching the point where he can no
longer work full-time. He plans to leave the state to return to his place of birth to die. I
wish to relocate there with him. This will involve a change ofjobs on my part. We're
worried about the future of our health-care insurance and have questions about our
coverage. We already know he will face thousands of dollars of expenses and I could be
in the same boat, someday. It is difficult to get a direct answer from any credible
source. We get a different story from everyone we speak to. We fear breaches of pri-
vacy if we make formal requests for the information we need. He is covered under an
HMO (health maintenance organization) plan, I'm covered by Blue Cross-Blue
Shield. Can you help us?6
This letter underscores the truly devastating human cost of AIDS. Imagine how the panic
will grow as AIDS spreads more widely, into the heterosexual population, and millions of
people suddenly begin to wonder who will pay for their medical costs, their living ex-
penses, and the expenses and costs of their families. AIDS will become synonymous with
another ugly word— bankruptcy. In fact, in many cases, it already has. Consider the
following statistics: 7
• The average medical costs associated with AIDS are $97 ,000perpatient.
Recent studies found that average lifetime costs range from $45,000 in
special managed-care situations to up to $140,000.
• As of January 18, 1988, the cumulative number ofAIDS cases reported in
the United States was 51 ,361 . Of that number, 28,683 are known to have
resulted in death, 56 percent of the total.
• By the end of 199 1 , 270,000 cumulative cases ofAIDS will have been
reported in the United States, 179,000 of them fatalities (58 percent). In a
1986 survey, the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) attempted to
measure the extent of AIDS-related claims. Companies writing 46 percent
of the life and health insurance coverage in the United States responded.
Adjusting the figures to cover 100 percent of the people in the market, it is
estimated that AIDS-related death claims in 1986 were about $292 million.
• The average AIDS death claim on individual policies was $30,500, com-
pared with the average claim of $7,300 on all policies. (The lower figure
represents policies that have been on the books for thirty years or more and
whose value is unadjusted for inflation.)
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The average group life claim has been $27,000 for AIDS-related cases; the average
group health claim has been $13,800. The ACLI has said that the cost of health care asso-
ciated with AIDS claims varies from $45,000 on the West Coast to $140,000 on the East
Coast; the average claim is about $97,000, according to 1986 estimates. 8
Insurance consultant Barbara Lautzenheiser is a former vice president of the Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Company and a past president of the National Association of Actu-
aries. In a speech to life insurance underwriters in New Orleans in the spring of 1987, she
detailed a chilling cost scenario:
Assume that 100 men who are infected with the AIDS virus are issued insurance
because of the insurance company's inability to test for the infection. Assume each is
age 34 and purchases $100,000 of term insurance, the cheapest form of coverage that
builds no cash values. The average premium for the next seven years for that form of
coverage is $199 per year. Assume none of these persons dies for the whole of seven
years, then 20 percent die (the lowest percent expressed by the Centers for Disease
Control). The total death benefit payable is 20 x $100,000 equals $2 million.
How can the insurance company afford to pay out $2 million when all it has col-
lected is $139,300?9
And if this is not chilling enough, consider the facts quoted by Lautzenheiser from a Janu-
ary story in the Navy Times citing military research that suggests AIDS may kill 99.9
percent of those who are exposed to the AIDS virus. 10
Comments by Dr. James Mason, director of the federal Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, seem to confirm the degree of severity reported by the Navy
Times. "If we observe these infected individuals long enough," said Dr. Mason, "a figure
approximately 100 percent of those infected will develop symptoms of this disease, which
is eventually fatal." 11
That deadly prospect has the gay male community, especially in California, in a panic,
Lautzenheiser told the audience of underwriters in New Orleans. "Their greatest concern
is testing itself, because of fear of losing their jobs if the employer finds out they tested
positive; fear of the test results being recorded by name, so that there is a list that can be
subpoenaed and those on the list quarantined." Further, she said, "the issue now is money,
through health insurance to pay their health-care costs and through health insurance to
pay their 'partner's' health-care costs. Money will become even more important as
the size of the gay community becomes smaller and their less costly self-support system
vanishes."
Lautzenheiser had a warning for her insurance audience: The gay community is large
and influential, and it votes. Many gay men donate substantial amounts of money to politi-
cians who support their cause. Moreover, the gay male bloc is only one special-interest
group. "What will the diabetic or cancer foundations do when they find out they have to
pay substandard rates or can't get insurance when those infected with the AIDS virus can
get insurance at standard rates?" she asked. "What about those with multiple sclerosis,
muscular dystrophy, epilepsy, or any of the other diseases, particularly those which get
high television visibility? Can't you see a Labor Day Telethon on how Jerry's Kids were
discriminated against by the insurance industry?" 12
These comments make an implicit statement about the cost of insuring a person with
AIDS: Once a person has AIDS, it doesn't abate. He or she is always faced with the al-
most certain probability of dying. Therefore, a person with AIDS is uninsurable. In the
case of heart attacks, for instance, there are all types and severities. People who have
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coronary attacks have the potential to recover; after five to eight years of recovery, they
can usually buy insurance at standard rates. Depending on how young they are when the
disease begins, diabetics have a more difficult time buying insurance. Juvenile diabetics
are virtually uninsurable because of their high mortality rate. Persons between the ages of
twenty and forty-five will pay heavy extra premiums; those between the ages of forty-five
and sixty will pay moderate extra rates; persons over sixty will pay near-standard rates.
Once a person is "rated" for diabetes, however, the surcharge is never removed.
Other temporary conditions that can cost extra premiums are hypertension, elevated
cholesterol, and elevated triglycerides. In cases such as these, a change in lifestyle, a loss
of weight, and strict adherence to a medical regimen can often result in an improved con-
dition. That's usually enough of a reason for the insurer to consider reducing or eliminat-
ing any extra premium being charged.
AIDS cases, however, don't get less expensive, at least not yet. Consequently, the only
recourse for many families and friends of persons with AIDS is to find ways to offer sup-
port. In Boston, the gay male community has, to its credit, provided help with specific
activities. The AIDS Action Committee held fund-raisers and distributed more than
$150,000 in FY' 87 for direct financial assistance. Additionally, the committee provided
many basic services not available from professionals, such as transportation, a meals-on-
wheels program, practical home care and counseling services, and support from volun-
teer nonprofessionals.
In San Francisco, the gay male community has conducted similar volunteer programs.
A California study showed that the cost of care for AIDS patients in San Francisco in their
final eighteen months of life averaged $52,000 to $74,000, well below the national figure
of $147,000 and the state's $65,000 to $110,000. 13
The solution for most long-term AIDS sufferers is turning to government assistance.
Most find themselves on welfare soon after beginning to suffer the most debilitating ef-
fects of the disease. Nationally, about 40 percent ofAIDS patients turn to Medicaid, and
their dependence becomes absolute on support such as food stamps, local welfare pro-
grams, Social Security Disability, and Supplemental Security income.
Nor is insurance the total answer to AIDS-related expenses, the sufferers and their
families have found. One agency in New York City, Gay Men's Health Crisis, estimates
that fewer than 30 percent of its clients with private health insurance will receive pay-
ments for prescription drugs. This statistic becomes more relevant to the AIDS patient as
new and costlier drugs are developed each year. Treatments with AZT, a new drug that
some say holds the best hope yet for treating AIDS, can cost up to $10,000 annually. 14
The Testing Dilemma
Nowhere in the AIDS dilemma is the push-pull between business and humanitarian inter-
ests more evident than in the debate about testing. Insurance underwriters, bound by their
responsibilities to directors and investors, will continue to press for unlimited testing.
Rights activists, concerned that testing is a potential threat to civil liberty, will continue to
call, at the very least, for limitations to general testing. Consultant Barbara Lautzenheiser
has urged life insurance underwriters to work to block any legislation to ban AIDS test-
ing. According to Lautzenheiser, any interference with AIDS testing poses a major threat
to the risk classification system upon which the insurance industry bases its ability to
approve or deny an application for insurance. With antitesting laws in place in California,
Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C., she says, some companies have simply stopped issuing
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life insurance. "Washington, D.C.'s legislation is so severe — not even allowing a non-
AIDS-specific test, called the T-cell test— [that a] Harvard University study reports that
of the sample they took, 80 percent of the life insurance companies have ceased writing
[policies] in the district. . . . California still allows the T-cell test, but one company an-
nounced on April 1 that it has withdrawn from that state, too." 15
It remains to be seen whether company pullouts are for real or whether they are just a
threat aimed at securing leverage with state legislatures and insurance commissioners
who may be considering similar actions. It is expected that several state legislatures and
insurance regulators will be called upon to act on some form of testing for their states
during 1988. Testing, unfortunately for our civil liberties, is the insurance industry's most
accurate method of identifying who among their potential policyholders is an AIDS
threat. Every New England state except Connecticut has proposed legislation that, while
controlling or limiting test procedures, would in fact allow testing to take place. In Massa-
chusetts, an attempt by Insurance Commissioner Peter Hiam to be protective about AIDS
testing eventually cost him his job. 16
The practice of using blood testing as a general underwriting requirement on cases involv-
ing $1 million or more came about ten years ago, when life insurance companies discon-
tinued the practice of requiring two examinations on two different days by two different
medical examiners. Applicants complained about the inconvenience of the procedure and
said that the second examination was simply a duplicate of the first. Worse, some compa-
nies discovered that they were being charged for a second examination that in fact had not
been done. Underwriters decided that blood tests could give them more information and
more protection than a second examination.
It became common, if a life insurance applicant had a history of an abnormal blood
chemistry — indicative of diabetes, elevated cholesterol, gout, or an abnormal liver func-
tion— for a blood test to be taken at the time of the insurance examination. In that way, the
company could determine whether there was any change in the applicant's condition. The
underwriting of health insurance differs significantly from underwriting of life insurance.
Most health insurance is issued on a group basis. For smaller groups, this usually covers
all employees, without any medical examinations or blood tests, but with a "preexisting
exclusion rider." This rider means that certain conditions that existed at the inception of a
person's employment, or eligibility for group health coverage, will be covered only when
a predetermined waiting period expires. The "contestable period" can be from three
months to three years. (The use of the preexisting exclusion by health insurance under-
writers, particularly at claim time, has always been a source of irritation for consumers
who do not understand its beneficial significance. There have been cases in which con-
sumers, at the time of application, have had cancer, AIDS, or cardiovascular ailments and
have been unaware of these conditions, which would have escaped detection and treatment
had there been no test.) For most larger groups, or in some health maintenance organiza-
tions, there is guaranteed-issue insurance, without any exclusions for claims and benefits
due to preexisting conditions.
A relatively small amount of health insurance is sold on an individual basis. The pricing
of individual health insurance does not lend itself to the use of physical examinations and
blood testing as underwriting requirements. Rather, these cases are underwritten on the
basis of medical information provided by the applicant. The applicant is asked to detail
past and present illnesses and to provide the names and addresses of hospitals and doctors
consulted.
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From this information, health insurance underwriters can determine whether the appli-
cant is eligible for coverage, is required to pay a penalty surcharge, or must be assigned a
longer waiting period for a preexisting condition.
In December 1987, because of the exclusion-clause problems with insurance compa-
nies, Attorney General James Shannon of Massachusetts proposed a change in the preex-
isting conditions clause of that state's accident and health (A & H) insurance policies — a
change that would make it harder for A & H insurers to deny coverage on this basis. 17
Shannon claimed that this change was based upon model language developed by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners.
In mid- 1986, fearing the adverse effect of AIDS mortality, life insurers began to reduce
the financial threshold at which blood tests would be required, even if there was no his-
tory of any abnormality to justify such testing. The testing threshold by December 1987
became $100,000 for most life insurers writing business in Massachusetts. On a number
of cases in the fall of 1986, some companies were already using this lower threshold on
smaller policies to get the client's blood and test it, without his or her informed consent,
for the AIDS antibody. 18
I brought this to the attention of Commissioner Hiam, who said he would enforce his
strict regulation banning blood testing and that he would look into this new development.
He had made it clear in the past that testing for the AIDS antibody would not be tolerated
in Massachusetts. Most insurers complied with the regulation, but others continued the
practice, as a way of testing the insurance commissioner's authority to tell them how to
conduct business. If they conceded to Hiam on an arbitrary ruling, they reasoned, then
they could eventually lose control of their underwriting prerogatives. 19
In March 1987, Ronald N. Shehade, manager of American Para Professional Systems
of Wellesley, a company that draws blood samples for testing, told me: "Laboratory tech-
nicians in the field no longer have control over the blood samples. The lab does not ac-
knowledge receipt of the sample, they do not furnish us or you [the insurance applicant]
with the results, nor can we or you obtain these results."
Writing about this situation a year ago, I advised consumers to confirm with their insur-
ance agents which tests have been requested from the laboratory, while keeping in mind
that the tests vary by company. 20 (Today, however, some laboratories will provide a confir-
mation describing the tests that might be done.)
At worst, by attempting to influence blood-testing requirements and procedures, some
insurers are ignoring the root causes of the disease. Some of them are hiding their heads
in the shifting sands of circumstance, pain, and desperation. AIDS is here to stay. If a fail-
safe blood test, one that completely eliminated false-positive results, were ever to become
available, insurance companies would be in a better position to justify their legitimate
concerns about blood screening for the AIDS antibody being a component part of the life
underwriting process.
Nevertheless, when testing is a requirement for life insurance, insurers should be more
candid with their applicants, telling them just what they expect from persons who buy
insurance and why they have established those underwriting guidelines which are in use.
They should make it clear to all applicants exactly what will be done with their blood
sample after it is drawn, even though in Massachusetts, such disclosure is not mandatory.
They should explain the reasons for and the types of tests to be performed by the labora-
tory on the samples drawn. Most important, they should explain to the insurance applicant
how they will guarantee the protection of his or her privacy as reports of the test filter
down through the underwriting process.
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These things are necessary not only for the financial protection of the public, whose
loved ones may — almost certainly will — feel the sting of the AIDS crisis, but also for the
protection of the companies that must insure them as well. This is a situation in which the
survival of the insurance industry is at stake. The most certain element in all of this is that
the future can't be left to insurance industry management, which at times speaks out of
both sides of its mouth— crying poverty when looking for legislative help, then becoming
aggressive and throwing out the rate books when competing for a sale. 21
From December 1986 to June 1987, representatives of the insurance commissioner's
office carried on negotiations with the insurance industry to develop a fair and equitable
blood-testing policy in Massachusetts. In a proposed compromise, insurers would be
allowed to underwrite their business and eliminate and screen any applicant who might
have AIDS, while preserving the rights of individuals who knowingly agreed to submit to
the test.
Negotiations broke down, and because of the politics involved, Hiam resigned on the
eve of the issuance of Governor Michael S. Dukakis's blood-testing plan. That plan was
opposed by the industry, because it required blood testing in applications for more than
$100,000 of life insurance and imposed an onerous administrative burden on companies
to enforce the very rigid requirement of privacy and confidentiality spelled out in the
proposed regulation. Persons applying for less than $100,000 do not face a mandatory
blood test requirement.
Consumer groups opposed the plan, primarily because of the privacy risks involved in
submitting to blood testing. In my newspaper column, I suggested to the governor an
alternative that would make available insurance that would exclude any death benefit if
death were due to AIDS and for which no blood testing would be required. 22
Insurers licensed to do business in Massachusetts (with one exception) opposed the
concept. They felt that once a policy was in effect for more than two years, they could not
contest the circumstances surrounding the death and its preceding events. The companies
charged that doctors declared other causes of death, such as pneumonia and various forms
of cancer, to mask real cause of death— AIDS — in an attempt to protect the family's
privacy.
Proponents of an AIDS exclusion option say it would save insurance companies millions
of dollars spent on testing procedures, laboratory fees, lengthy investigative consumer
reports, and costly underwriting practices. These funds would then be available to reduce
the cost of insurance for all consumers. No insurance industry-related job would be lost,
and the insurance companies would continue to invest millions of dollars in the economy
through their financing, building, and investments. Opponents of eliminating coverage for
AIDS say that once a policy has gone beyond the "contestable period," the insurer has no
right to investigate the circumstances surrounding a death. This is a problem because, in
many cases, death certificates for AIDS in fact do not tell the true story.
Further, opponents argue, consumers who have no reason to believe they are infected
with AIDS would no longer be inhibited from applying for life insurance because of the
potential adverse consequences of a test. After insurance had been issued, there would be
nothing to prevent an individual from taking an AIDS antibody test on a confidential
basis. Even better, individuals with the AIDS antibody, who ordinarily would not be able
to buy life insurance, would be able to insure themselves for accidental death or for death
caused by other illnesses, such as stroke, heart attack, or cancer.
Apart from the obvious medical and psychosocial impact of the disease, what better
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deterrent could a person have to avoid behavior that could result in AIDS than the knowl-
edge that life insurance would become void upon death? What better educational tech-
nique could the federal government implement than loss of life insurance for policy-
holders who develop AIDS?
Savings Bank Life Insurance adopted my recommendation, and it was approved by the
new insurance commissioner, Roger M. Singer, when he promulgated another set of
AIDS-testing regulations, after two days of hearings (which brought considerable opposi-
tion). As of December 1987, Savings Bank Life Insurance had written more than $1 .7
billion of life insurance coverage on Massachusetts residents which excludes coverage for
AIDS.
In early October 1987, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted the life and health
insurance industry a preliminary injunction against Singer's AIDS regulations. Under the
order, the commissioner was prevented from implementing and enforcing his testing
rules. 23
"Failure to issue the injunctive relief prayed for will subject the plaintiffs to a substan-
tial risk of irreparable harm," the court said. "This loss will be immediate and consist of
not only unquantifiable economic losses, but loss of good will, deprivation of property
rights, and a restraint of the plaintiffs' ability to compete."
The ruling continued: "There is also a serious question raised that the regulation is in
violation of the Equal Protection provision of the U.S. Constitution, as well as an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative powers under the Massachusetts Constitution."
Perhaps as a warning about the uncertainties of the legal process, the court also re-
marked: "It appears clear that there is a substantial possibility that the plaintiffs will be
successful after a full hearing on the merits." 24
Now that the battle lines are drawn, insurance applicants are at the mercy of the insurers,
who say they are only exercising their legitimate rights and are testing for the AIDS anti-
body whenever possible.
This controversy can be expected to be played out in the courts for some time. No mat-
ter what decision is reached in the Massachusetts Superior Court, it is virtually certain
that the case will ultimately land in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The insurance industry is bringing its heavy guns to battle in the Massachusetts courts.
It believes that Massachusetts is a bellwether state in the insurance industry — as Massa-
chusetts goes, so goes the nation.
Appreciating the potential liability exposure involved in blood testing, various insurers,
including John Hancock, Northwestern, and Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany, have prepared self-serving brochures that are handed to applicants to assuage any
concern about the reliability of the testing and the confidentiality of the results. A look at
"Why Am I Being Tested?" — a portion of a Mass Mutual brochure issued late in 1987 —
illustrates the point:
Question: Am I being tested because Mass Mutual thinks I have AIDS?
Answer: No. In fact, the Company believes it very unlikely. It is anticipated that the
overwhelming percentage (well over 99 percent) of the AIDS antibody tests
performed will be negative. [This would seem to underline the concern that
there will be false-positive test results.]
Under "What IfMy Blood Test Comes Back Positive?" we find:
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Question: Will positive results from the AIDS antibody test also be sent automatically
to the MIB [the Medical Information Bureau, a supersecret and highly
computerized industry information clearinghouse whose headquarters are
inWestwood]?
Answer: Yes, but the HIV antibody test results do not have a specific code; they fall
under a catchall code used for any blood abnormality that does not have a
code of its own. This code indicates that an abnormality has been found, but
does not specify which type.
This answer by Mass Mutual, which represents the industry's current practice, puts peo-
ple who have blood abnormalities that are not terminal or life-threatening in the same
category as a carrier of the AIDS antibody, a pure and simple form of reverse discrimina-
tion.
To Peter Hiam, the insurance industry's early call for widespread testing demonstrated
its panic. Cognizant of the enormous social and economic implications of a positive AIDS
test, not to mention the high potential for a false-positive or false-negative test result,
Hiam banned testing in Massachusetts. Barbara Lautzenheiser was well aware of Hiam'
s
actions: "Apparently the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner doesn't read the news-
papers," she chided in her New Orleans speech last spring. "As of April 20, there were
34,513 cases [of AIDS]. That's 2,531 since March 9. That's 60 new cases per day," said
the concerned insurance consultant. What was worse, she said, the Centers for Disease
Control expected up to 18,000 new cases ofAIDS in 1986. Actually, there were only
13, 197 new cases that year.
"The number of cases is still doubling," said Lautzenheiser, "but only over 24 months
instead of every year. Just think of what I've said— only every 2 years doubling instead of
every year. That's still horrendous. ... I don't think the insurers are reacting in haste. I
think they are reacting in waste — wasted time for action." 25
Further proof that the insurance industry is well within its rights to call for testing,
Lautzenheiser said, was that the gay male community — the group with the highest risk
factor— has called for the greater availability of insurance for AIDS victims, even if the
insurance is offered on a more expensive assigned risk pool concept, if testing positive is
not considered a preexisting condition. However, "[homosexual men] do not want testing
to be a surrogate for classification by sexual orientation," Lautzenheiser said.
Now contrast Lautzenheiser 's views with those of Massachusetts state representative
David B. Cohen, writing in the Boston Globe in August 1987. Citing figures developed by
his office in the summer of 1987 from statistics available from the Massachusetts Division
of Insurance, Cohen said the following:
There is little evidence to support giving AIDS tests to applicants for life insurance.
For all of the dire predictions that a flood of AIDS-related death claims would sweep
insurers into insolvency, the fiscal impact of the disease on the industry has been
minuscule. In Massachusetts, out of more than $1.5 billion in death claims, only
$551 ,000 has been related to AIDS. This amounts to about 15 cents per policy per
year. While insurers are quick to point out that the incidence of AIDS may triple by
1991 , even a tenfold increase in claims payouts in that time would still amount to only
$1 .50 per policy per year. At the same time, it costs $50 per policy to test for the AIDS
virus. 26
An illustration of the "great debate" going on about the AIDS testing issue came in
June 1987 in an edition of the Sunday Boston Herald. 27 The editors contrasted, on a single
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tabloid page, the viewpoints of pro- and anti-testing advocates. Calling for use of "all
appropriate tools at our disposal" to help the nation meet the AIDS crisis was William
Bennett, the U.S. secretary of education. Warning that public health can be guarded only
"by protecting confidentiality and prohibiting discrimination" was U.S. Rep. Henry
Waxman, the Democrat from California.
The salient points of argument from the article:
Bennett: Even if routine testing drove a few individuals underground, this would have
to be balanced against the crucial need for information that more widespread testing
would produce for individuals and for society, information that would save lives.
Waxman: We cannot expect people to respond to medical advice if in doing so they
jeopardize their jobs, housing, insurance, privacy, children, families and their futures.
Misuse of testing and test results could damage the nation's ability to study and under-
stand the AIDS epidemic. What we know about the disease we know because gay men
and AIDS patients have volunteered to cooperate with research. If misguided testing
drives these people underground, it will only prolong the epidemic.
Bennett: Precautions can be taken to guard against violating confidentiality, particu-
larly in identifying sexual partners. This is already being done in many states in cases
involving venereal disease.
Waxman: Testing policy is uncertain. While the Public Health Service has issued
statements opposing discrimination against people who test positive, the Justice De-
partment says discrimination is legal and not the government's problem, even when
based on irrational fears. The mixed policy means only individuals who either have
nothing to lose or already have the disease will seek testing. Persons who might have
been exposed to AIDS and those who might be infectious will avoid testing.
Bennett: AIDS tests are not unreliable. In the rare case where a false positive result
occurs, this can be resolved by using a follow-up test.
Waxman: The test does not indicate who is sick. It pinpoints most, but not all, persons
who have been exposed and who are probably infectious. Because the disease is trans-
mitted only by sex and blood, the medical usefulness of tests is limited to blood banks,
the individual tested and his or her sexual partners.
In a summation, Waxman stated his fears about a "nightmarish" situation: "Black-
market blood tests, forged ID cards, bribed officials, safe houses and fugitives," all the
result of the tyranny of mandatory testing. "A testing policy that does not guarantee that
test results will be used fairly and respectfully will be recognized as the house-to-house
search that it is. Programs that test, fire and quarantine people will make our America
into Anne Frank's Europe," the congressman wrote.
With all the controversy that the issue has created, with differing opinions expressed by
consumers, government, and the insurance industry, the health insurance industry, mean-
while, continues to worry about statistics that estimate claims costs in AIDS cases can run
up to $100,000 a year per case. While health insurers realize they are already covering
active workers who are carriers of the AIDS antibody, they say a greater threat is posed by
giving insurance to new applicants who could be known or unknown carriers of AIDS.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, whose health insurance covers 55 percent of the Massachu-
setts market, says that, for now, it has no plans to require testing for AIDS. It will continue
to pay for the treatment and hospitalization of AIDS and any FDA-approved medications,
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including AZT. That coverage is subject to the terms and conditions of the individual
subscriber's coverage.
According to Dr. James Young, vice president and medical director of Blue Cross-Blue
Shield in Massachusetts, handling this problem in any other manner, including blood
testing, would be contrary to the mission and role of Blue Cross in the marketplace. Blue
Cross, he notes, was established to spread the actuarial risks throughout its entire mem-
bership. 28
Consumers should not expect such generous treatment from the commercial health
insurers. These companies have fiduciary obligations to operate profitably, and they can
be expected to attack the AIDS problem on two fronts. Existing business, they say, will
experience significant rate increases, more restrictive waiting periods, and tougher pre-
existing exclusion riders for new employees. They will also attempt to make policy de-
ductibles a percentage of an employee's income. Finally, commercial insurers will at-
tempt to require AIDS blood tests for new employees in certain health insurance
programs.
The informational authorization you provide when applying for insurance will also take
on new meaning in the AIDS era. Few insurance applicants realize that when they sign an
insurance application they also sign a privacy release that relates not only to information
on the form itself, but also to facts that may be uncovered during the investigation of their
medical history.
The typical authorization seems simple enough: "I hereby authorize any licensed physi-
cian, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic or other medically related facility, insurance
company, any medical information bureau or other organization, institution, or person
having any records or knowledge ofme or my health to give the insurance company any
such information. A photocopy of this signed authorization shall be valid as the original."
In plain English, this statement means: "I authorize anybody with any knowledge about
me to give this knowledge to the insurance company." Nowhere does it limit information
strictly to the applicant's insurability or ability to pay premiums. The validity of the au-
thorization is not time-limited on most authorization forms.
Consumers who decide to go forward with their insurance should ask ahead of time to
see the blood authorization forms and should ask clarifying questions. They are entitled to
determine ahead of time what test is deemed necessary by the insurer and whether it in-
cludes an AIDS antibody test. If the AIDS antibody test is going to be taken, the company
should say so. It should not hide behind the phrase "such testing as may be deemed neces-
sary." 29
The important thing here is that, while insurance companies have a right to remain
financially viable, consumers have a right to know what is going to happen to their pri-
vacy and what is going to happen to their blood. After that information has been ascer-
tained, consumers can decide whether to buy insurance from a particular company or
whether to find another company that does not require a blood test.
The Privacy Issue
There is no question that once a person admits on an insurance application that he or she
has taken an AIDS test, insurance underwriters will always consider that person's health
suspect. The underwriter will want to know the reason for the test. Was the applicant
concerned that sexual promiscuity caused exposure to the AIDS virus? Was the decision
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to take the test due to a blood transfusion? Did another underwriter require the test be-
cause of the consumer's lifestyle? Whatever the answers, the key to the privacy issue,
from an insurance point of view, is understanding that underwriters are trained to err on
the side of caution.
In an attempt to help settle the emotional outcry about AIDS, the National Insurance
Commissioners Association has created an Advisory Committee on the disease. A mem-
ber of the committee has offered the following guidelines for testing:
• Prior informed consent must be secured from the applicant regarding the
antibody test.
• Insurance companies must apply the test on a nondiscriminatory basis, not
on the basis of sexual orientation.
• Health insurance should be available for all persons who test positive.
• All insurance companies should set a specific minimum amount of insur-
ance above which testing would be mandatory.
• Insurance companies should be allowed to test only if the laws of the partic-
ular state do not require reporting positive test results to the state health
department.
The committee is also concerned that sexual orientation should not be used by insurance
companies to make underwriting decisions. Some suggested guidelines for medical and
lifestyle questions to be used by insurers are as follows:
• The marital status or living arrangements of insurance applicants should
not be used to establish the applicant's sexual orientation.
• The question of gender should not be used to help determine the sexual
orientation of the applicant or for further investigation of the applicant.
• Insurance companies should not establish "redlined" districts in which
coverage would be denied, as is sometimes done in underwriting fire
insurance.
• No applicant for life or health insurance should be rejected because he
or she has sought advice or counsel about AIDS from health care profes-
sionals.
These are all good suggestions and would go a long way toward settling the AIDS panic
that is appearing in more and more segments of American society, both private and com-
mercial. There is no doubt that people who seek insurance have a right to be concerned. If
an insurance company in Massachusetts requests a blood test, chances are excellent that
the applicant's blood sample will be tested for AIDS. In Kansas, the Home Office Refer-
ence Laboratory, whose facilities are used by 85 percent of the nation's insurers, con-
firmed this in 1986. Several dozen of the more than three hundred companies operating in
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Massachusetts, the laboratory said, were requesting AIDS-related tests without the appli-
cants' knowledge. 30
If there is nothing in an insurance applicant's background to justify such a blood test,
and if the insurance seeker wants to avoid the stigma associated with AIDS testing, several
options are available. A blood test taken by the applicant's own physician, during an an-
nual checkup, say, is usually acceptable. The applicant should check with different insur-
ers for their testing policies. And there's nothing wrong with the applicant's personal
physician using his or her office laboratory to perform the test. Finally, applicants can
insist that the insurance company provide them with a letter certifying that the company
will not test their blood for the AIDS antibody.
The harsh reality of the privacy issue in the AIDS era, however, is that the implicit
confidentiality between doctor and patient may no longer exist. This issue was discussed
as early as 1985 in a Washington publication, the Privacy Journal, which saw four distinct
categories of threats to confidentiality:
First, one's status as a patient with the disease; second, results of blood test possibly
showing that an individual carries the AIDS virus and may spread the disease, even
though he himself does not have it and may never have it; third, one's identity as a
donor of blood, a confidential status now threatened because infected blood transfu-
sions are thought to be one way in which the disease spreads; and finally, one's sexual
preference. 31
The journal makes the point that "everybody seems to want to know who the AIDS pa-
tients are," and reminds us that in earlier times, lepers were required to wear warning
bells. 32 (That was really an invasion of privacy!)
Perhaps the biggest threat to privacy comes with the increasingly prevalent insurance or
job application question, "Do you engage in homosexual activities?" The appearance of
AIDS on the medical and insurance horizon gave justification to a horde of officials who
would like to have just this sort of information for their files. The tragedy, the Privacy
Journal notes, is that "this comes at a time when one's sexual preference had just been
generally accepted as one's own business, even though there are few, if any, statutes or
court decisions recognizing such a right of confidentiality." 33
Lack of confidentiality in medical records is another issue that has blossomed along
with the AIDS epidemic. Despite the alleged protection of medical records, particularly
those records which are involved in underwriting life and health insurance, there is no
guarantee that such derogatory information can be kept secure. The most prominent
keeper of such information for the insurance industry, the Medical Information Bureau,
has frequently asserted that its information has not been used in any way that is harmful to
insurance applicants.
Founded in 1902, the MIB has stored in its Boston computer information on more than
12 million Americans. If you discount the data-processing system the Social Security
Administration uses for programs like Medicare, the MIB probably qualifies as the larg-
est information network in the medical field. Insurance companies that belong to the
MIB — those which write most of the life insurance in the United States — can receive
your file in less than thirty minutes, at a cost of less than $1 per inquiry. Part of the author-
ization on a policy application is permission for the insurance company to go to the MIB
for your file — and for the company to give the MIB a report on you.
The MIB says that this information exchange is necessary to provide insurance compa-
nies with safeguards against those who may hide medical facts about themselves in order to
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gain lower premiums than they would ordinarily be assigned. The MIB does not record
specific underwriting decisions, but it does record the content of specific insurance com-
pany reports. It maintains that strict rules guarantee confidentiality within its organization
and among its member companies, and that it makes every effort to keep its files accurate.
Despite these guarantees, the MIB cannot be depended upon to protect personal pri-
vacy, according to some privacy advocates who have criticized the agency. The insurance
companies say that the bureau maintains numerous secret codes through which it can
enter a derogatory note about an insurance applicant. Yet the MIB refuses to make known
to consumers either the conditions that call for such an entry or the codes themselves.
According to Neil Day, MIB president, it is in the public's best interest not to have the
code list and related data made public. This policy, he says, is consistent with the MIB's
primary concern: the high level of confidentiality the agency says it has maintained for
many years.
Unlike the federal government, the insurance industry does not classify underwriting
data and consumer files with any degree of sophisticated security protection or safeguard
from access by any unauthorized personnel. There are no shredders who destroy sensitive
medical and mental health information and all types of blood test results. Blanket, unlim-
ited authorizations can be photocopied at any time.
The Federal Privacy Act of 1974 created the Privacy Protection Study Commission. For
two years, the panel conducted a review of individual privacy rights which included an
examination of the medical-record-keeping practices of the insurance industry. Reporting
to President Jimmy Carter in 1977, the commission said its findings and recommenda-
tions could serve to safeguard a person's right to be fairly treated, and to be spared un-
warranted intrusion.
A major recommendation of the commission's report was that no insurance company
should ask, require, or induce an individual to sign any statement authorizing any individ-
ual or any institution to disclose information about him or her unless that statement was
specific as to its expiration date, which should be reasonable— not to exceed one year,
and, in the case of life insurance and noncancelable or guaranteed-renewable health insur-
ance, two years after the date of the policy.
That recommendation has been implemented in a handful of states, including Virginia,
California, and Connecticut, as part of state privacy laws. Thus far, Massachusetts has
refused to enact similar privacy legislation. This may change, however, when the 1988
state legislature considers a bill filed by the state Insurance Department called the Insur-
ance Information and Privacy Protection Act. This law would pertain to all forms of insur-
ance— life, health, disability, property, and casualty.
The law would protect all data obtained by an underwriter as an applicant sought insur-
ance. Limitations pertaining to informed consent and time periods have been recom-
mended for applicants' medical authorization forms. And the manner in which personal
information can be collected by third parties has been defined, with protection afforded
the consumer.
Some insurers have voluntarily amended required authorization forms to conform to
provisions mandated in states with privacy laws. Most insurers doing business in Massa-
chusetts, however, still require consumers to sign authorization forms that have no expira-
tion date.
And so, the abuse of consumers' privacy goes on in Massachusetts, as insurers continue
to use unauthorized practices to detect potential AIDS cases. How can applicants be ex-
pected to trust insurers when their record of deceit is known? What the consumer comes
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away with is the knowledge that the investigatory authorizations they sign are misleading
and deceptive and carry erroneous implications that the signer has given the insurer con-
sent.
Now that the Massachusetts courts have sided with the insurance industry and have
prevented the implementation of Insurance Commissioner Singer's more cautionary
AIDS blood-testing policy, the deadly antibody is fair game for all insurers selling life
insurance. Even consumers applying for modest amounts of life insurance are going to be
threatened. There will be the usual blood profile— previously the only requirement in
million-dollar cases or where there was suspicion of an abnormal blood chemistry. But
now there will be an AIDS test and, in some cases, a drug screening.
The insurers' position, as noted earlier, is that liver cancer, diabetes, and kidney dis-
eases have been discovered during a blood screen, conditions that would not have been
spotted were it not for the threat of AIDS. If the consumer is going to be given a free test
that could reveal life-threatening problems, they argue, isn't the AIDS test worth the risk?
The answer is, not really. Consumers can have blood tests taken by their personal physi-
cian and avoid the potential loss of privacy, the effect of an unauthorized disclosure of
false positives, and the impact on their insurability and employment.
Until legislation is enacted to clarify these authorization forms, all consumers are in
jeopardy. For example, the form provided by the Prudential Insurance-owned GIB Labo-
ratories of Newark, New Jersey, says the following:
The blood drawn from you today will be sent to GIB Laboratories, where it will be
subjected to such testing as deemed necessary or desirable by the requesting insurance
company. This may include testing for human T-cell lymphotropic virus-type III anti-
bodies, associated with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (unless precluded by
law). The results of the testing will be reported to the requesting insurance company
for use by it and/or its affiliates in considering you for insurance. These results may
also be reported to any reinsurer, to other companies to whom you apply for insurance
or submit claims, and to the Medical Information Bureau for the use and purposes set
forth in the notice on your application for insurance.
The form provided by the insurance industry's largest blood-testing facility — the
Home Office Reference Laboratory — tells you that HORL will perform some or all tests
(if permitted by law) on the basis of standing instructions from the insurance company.
The tests include blood profile, T-cell count and ratio, hemoglobic ALC, apoliproprotein,
full drug screen, CBC, and HIV (HTLV-HI) antibody screen.
Again, there is an attempt to deceive the applicant. If the standing instructions from the
insurance company call for a full drug screening and an AIDS antibody screening, the
consumer should be told. He should not be misled into thinking that because he has led a
clean life, the insurer will not test his blood for drugs or the AIDS antibody.
Searching for Solutions
With AIDS-related discord growing daily among the public, the insurance industry, and
the industry's regulators, government agencies have attempted to develop solutions to the
problems that the disease presents to all segments of society. None of these efforts have
been completely successful; some have been rejected or modified to the point where mat-
ters have returned to pre-action status in several states. There is no easy solution. What-
ever attempts are made to track the disease and provide for its costs are bound to meet
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with civil and human rights objections, regulatory and health service omissions and viola-
tions of policy, and violations of policies already established by existing statutes. The
courts, indeed, have not heard the last of the AIDS issue.
If insurance companies are to be believed, the only legitimate concern underlying their
demands to test life insurance applicants for AIDS is an effort to avoid insuring individ-
uals with a limited life expectancy. No one, even unfortunates who have the dread disease,
can quarrel with that reasoning. The public realizes that no insurer wants to write fire
insurance on a burning building.
But until the federal government or state governments can establish pools to provide life
insurance for uninsurable applicants — carriers ofAIDS and persons who have terminal
cancer and other terminal conditions — these persons will have to seek coverage through
guaranteed-issue forms of group insurance, or make other arrangements to protect their
estates.
However important it may be, the issue raised by the insurers in the AIDS-testing con-
troversy — the need to underwrite for a profit and to protect policyholders and share-
holders from adverse financial consequences — is not their entire concern. This is a
public relations ploy used to conceal the real issue.
An examination of the Dukakis administration's proposed testing regulations, whose
implementation is ultimately dependent upon the decision of the courts, shows that insur-
ers not only want to keep out AIDS-infected applicants, but also persons whose lifestyle
includes promiscuous sexual behavior or drug use that could ultimately result in becom-
ing infected with the virus. The thirty-three-page proposal, in fact, represents the poten-
tial for the greatest bad for the greatest number of persons. The section entitled "Prohib-
ited Practices" contains the crux of the regulations:
• No insurer shall make any underwriting decision on the basis of nationality,
sexual orientation or proxies for sexual orientation such as lifestyle, living
arrangements, marital status, beneficiary designation, employment, and
residence. This means an applicant may not be denied insurance coverage,
charged an additional premium or be requested or required to submit to
AIDS-related tests on the basis of any of these factors. To the extent that
employment, residence, or marital status [is] used in a manner that is
clearly unrelated to sexual orientation, it may be used for underwriting
purposes to the extent such use is permitted under any other applicable law
or regulation.
• No insurer shall seek to elicit, either directly or through an investigation
conducted by another on its behalf, any information designed to determine
an applicant's sexual orientation. It is also the insurer's duty to inform its
staff and any other support organization about any such information in-
cluded in any report or otherwise communicated.
• Insurers shall not use the fact that an individual has sought or received
counseling related to AIDS or AIDS-related complex to deny coverage or
otherwise evaluate insurability. Insurers are prohibited from seeking infor-
mation specifically related to AIDS or ARC counseling either on an appli-
cation or in the course of their investigations.
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Included in the proposed regulation is an elaborate provision designed to safeguard the
confidentiality of all information pertaining to AIDS-related blood testing. Severe penal-
ties are recommended for violation of these provisions. That's all fine, but what about
protection of the confidentiality of results of other types of blood tests and other records
pertaining to consumers' physical and mental health which represent a component part of
their life insurance file? These are those sensitive psychiatric histories, confinements in
alcoholic rehabilitation clinics, coronary and cancer histories, and blood tests involving
abnormal blood chemistries.
Insurers in Massachusetts, meanwhile, continue to duck and dodge the AIDS bullet.
Some insurers plan to avoid becoming embroiled in controversy and costly lawsuits by
increasing the size of their minimum policy to $125,000 or $150,000, well above the
minimum testing requirement threshold. To avoid attacks by the civil libertarians, they
will be forced to determine the lifestyle risk solely on the basis of the blood test results. In
another move we'll see more of, group life insurance underwriters who are denied the
opportunity to test applicants for AIDS can be expected to substantially reduce the
amounts of guaranteed-issue life insurance coverage provided under their contracts. And
the cost of term insurance— a temporary, inexpensive coverage— for applicants under
age forty can be expected to dramatically increase in order to compensate insurance com-
panies for the added costs of blood tests and confidentiality compliance in the proposed
Massachusetts regulations.
Finally, consumers who relied on their group insurance for the major portion of their
life insurance protection will have to turn to the individual market, one that will effec-
tively be discriminating against the young buyer of smaller policies. Policies in amounts of
$100,000 or less will be scarce, and the cost of term policies that will be available can be
expected to increase by as much as 50 percent.
In the absence of any short-term medical breakthrough that could provide a cure for
AIDS, we can only hope that the Massachusetts courts will resolve the testing issue before
them so that the rights of Massachusetts insurance consumers will be protected. This
means that whenever insurers intend to test for the AIDS antibody, consumers should be
so advised. Only responsible, experienced blood laboratories should be used, and every
effort should be employed to preserve the confidentiality of the test results.
In a decision that is indicative of the income that AIDS screening could develop, Trans-
america Occidental Life earlier this year said that it is going to finance and will be part
owner of a new testing laboratory for insurance companies.
James Dederer, Transamerica senior vice president, said that his company's initial
startup capital contribution will be approximately $9 million. He said that the new labora-
tory, one of three in the United States that will serve insurance companies exclusively, will
focus on future markets as the demand for services increases. Transamerica is teaming up
with Jim Osborn, who pioneered the use of blood profiles in underwriting and was the
founder of the Home Office Reference Laboratory, which he sold in 1983 to Business
Men's Assurance Company.
Osborn said that in 1987, approximately 1 million tests were performed for insurance
purposes, generating about $1 million in revenues. "If most insurance companies shift to
testing at the $100,000 level, a trend which is already well under way," he noted, "the
potential market will be over 5 million tests annually."
The Life Insurance Marketing Research Association reports that only about 2 percent
of the 17. 1 million life insurance policies written in 1985 provided coverage of $300,000
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or more, while 25 percent were for $100,000 or more. Some have estimated that AIDS
screening alone could produce $500 million a year in the testing business within a few
years. 34
Despite assurances from David Carpenter, chairman and chief executive officer of
Transamerica Occidental, that confidentiality is a critical factor, particularly with the
AIDS crisis, and that precautions will be taken to ensure such privacy, the very fact that at
least two insurers could have access to blood-testing results — as could happen when
Transamerica tests for other insurers — raises additional legitimate consumer concerns
about privacy.
Industry spokesperson Barbara Lautzenheiser was asked whether entry to a blood-
testing file by another insurer would be considered a conflict of interest and a detriment to
consumer interest— since the risk of privacy abuse would increase because both the in-
surance company being applied to and a competing insurer would have access to the test
results. She responded that because of consumers' legitimate concerns, Transamerica
would be extra-sensitive to the need for adequate privacy controls and confidentiality.
As we approach the presidential nominating conventions of the Democratic and Repub-
lican Parties, one has to wonder how many of the candidates may have already foregone
the opportunity to purchase additional life insurance, the need for which has been created
by campaign debts incurred and the risks inherent in the job they seek. No doubt, they
have been reluctant to take the required insurance company blood test to determine the
presence of the AIDS antibody, because of the fear that a false-positive result could imme-
diately destroy their candidacy, tft)
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"A
r%,ndIdon rt know what my life expectancy is going to be, but I
certainly know the quality is improved, Iknow that not accepting
the shame or the guilt or the stigma thatpeople would throw on
me has certainly extended my life expectancy, Iknow that being
very up-front with myfriends, and myfamily and coworkers,
reduced a tremendous amount ofstress, and I would encourage
people to be very open withfriends and ifthey can 't handle it
then that's theirproblem and they 're going to have to cope
... 9*
with it.
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